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ANTITRUST-REPUDIATION OF THE INTRAENTERPRISE
CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE-Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.
INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Antitrust Act (the Act)' was designed to pro-
mote free competition in the marketplace by prohibiting anticom-
petitive commercial conduct.2 The Sherman Act prohibits 1) every
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade,3 and 2)
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or conspiracies or combi-
nations to monopolize.4
The Sherman Act contains a clear distinction between inde-
pendent acts of a single party and concerted acts of two or more
parties.5 Unilateral conduct of a single party is governed by section
2 of the Act and is declared unlawful only when it actually threat-
ens monopolization.' Concerted conduct effected through a "con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy" is governed by section 1 of
the Act and is scrutinized under a Rule of Reason analysis-a
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2. The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). For a more complete history of the
Sherman Act see Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
5. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, reh'g denied, 104
S. Ct. 2378 (1984).
6. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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more exacting scrutiny than under section 2. 7 As a result, deter-
mining whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct is "unilateral"
or "concerted" is a primary threshold analysis in applying the
Sherman Act.
Analysis becomes complex when the parties to an alleged
"concert of actions" in violation of section 1 of the Act are a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.8 The intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine evolved from attempts to define the manner of
concert required for a section 1 violation, and provides that section
1 liability is not foreclosed merely because the parties acting in
concert are parent and subsidiary corporations subject to common
ownership." Although the existence of the doctrine is attributed to
declarations made by the Supreme Court, the Court had not con-
sidered the merits of the doctrine until certiorari was granted in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.10
In Copperweld, the Court squarely confronted the issue of
whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are
capable of conspiring together in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. In a five to three decision, the Court held that, for anti-
trust purposes, the coordinated activities of such corporations
must be viewed as those of a single enterprise and therefore cannot
violate section 1.11 By so holding, the majority renounced the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine. Three justices dissented, arguing
that the anticompetitive acts alleged were manifestly illegal and
that the defendant corporations should not be immunized from lia-
7. The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently
is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the
independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and de-
mands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued
their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their com-
mon benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which eco-
nomic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving
in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may
well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive
potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient
monopoly.
Id. at 2741.
8. See Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316 (7th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 2736.
10. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
11. Id.
[Vol. 7:369370
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bility because of their common ownership."
The purpose of this Note is to examine the effects of the Cop-
perweld holding on antitrust regulation and enforcement. The
Note traces the development of the intraenterprise conspiracy doc-
trine and assesses its impact on past antitrust actions. It also ad-
dresses the question of whether the repudiation of the intraenter-
prise conspiracy doctrine will weaken antitrust enforcement in the
corporate arena. The Copperweld Court concludes that its decision
will not cripple antitrust enforcement due to the existence of other
policing measures." The Note will suggest, however, that in the
Copperweld decision, the majority displayed an alarming willing-
ness to elevate form over substance by ignoring the effects of the
anticompetitive conduct. Liability for manifestly anticompetitive
conduct should not depend wholly on the corporate form of the
defendant. The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine has a valid
place in the realm of antitrust enforcement and its repudiation was
unnecessarily premature.
THE CASE
In 1972, the Copperweld Corporation, a manufacturer of struc-
tural steel tubing, purchased the Regal Tube Company, 4 an unin-
corporated division of Lear Siegler, Inc. 5 By the terms of the sales
agreement, Lear Siegler and its subsidiaries were bound not to
compete with Regal in the United States for five years. 6 Cop-
perweld immediately transferred the division assets to a newly
formed, wholly owned Pennsylvania corporation, the Regal Tube
Co.
1 7
Shortly before the sale, Regal division president David Grohne
12. Id.; see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
13. A corporation's initial acquisition of control will always be subject to
scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Thereafter, the enterprise is fully subject to § 2
of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 28
STAT. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
Id. at 2745.
14. The predecessor to Regal Tube Co. was incorporated in Chicago in 1955
to manufacture structural steel tubing. From 1955 to 1968 it operated as a wholly
owned subsidiary of the C.E. Robinson Co. Lear Siegler purchased Regal Tube in
1968 and operated it as an unincorporated division. Id. at 2734.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The new subsidiary conducted business in Chicago, but shared Cop-
perweld's corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh. Id.
19851
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accepted a position as a corporate officer of Lear Siegler.' 8 After
the sale and while continuing to work for Lear Siegler, Grohne es-
tablished his own steel tubing business and formed the Indepen-
dence Tube Corp. 9 The new corporation ordered a tubing mill
from the Yoder Co., and began to compete with Regal in the man-
ufacture of steel tubing.20 Attorneys for Regal and Copperweld ad-
vised that Grohne was not bound by the agreement not to com-
pete, but that Copperweld could probably obtain an injunction to
prevent the use of any technical information or trade secrets be-
longing to Regal.2' The attorneys drafted a letter that Copperweld
sent to many persons and businesses with whom Grohne at-
tempted to deal.22 The letter warned that Copperweld would be
"greatly concerned if [Grohne contemplated] entering the struc-
tural tube market ' 23 in competition with Regal and promised to
take "any and all steps"2 4 which were necessary to protect the
know-how and trade secrets purchased from Lear Siegler. 25 Cop-
perweld also made contacts with a number of banks, real estate
firms, suppliers and customers to discourage them from doing busi-
ness with Independence.26
The Yoder Co. voided its acceptance of Independence's order
for a tubing mill after receiving one of the warning letters from
Copperweld Grohne's efforts to preserve the deal failed,28 but he
arranged to have a mill supplied by another company which also
received, but ignored, a warning letter from Copperweld.2 9 Had
Yoder performed under the original agreement, Independence
could have begun tubing manufacture nine months earlier.30
Independence Tube Corp. brought suit against Copperweld,
Regal and Yoder alleging anticompetitive behavior in violation of
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Copperweld contended that the letter was intended only to prevent third
parties from developing reliance interests which might make a court reluctant to
enjoin Grohne's operations. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2735.
29. Id.
30. Id.
[Vol. 7:369
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Sherman section 1.31 A jury found Copperweld and Regal guilty of
conspiracy to violate Sherman section 1.32 At a separate damages
hearing, the jury awarded Independence $2,499,009 which was
trebled to $7,497,027.13 The court awarded attorneys' fees and
costs. 3 4 Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
new trial were denied.35 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed," holding that there was enough separation between Cop-
perweld and Regal to treat them as separate actors.37
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the purpose of re-
viewing the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine by answering the
question of whether coordinated acts of a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary can constitute a combination or con-
spiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 8 The Court rejected
the notion of intraenterprise conspiracy and reversed. 9
BACKGROUND
Prior to granting certiorari in Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp.,40 the Supreme Court had not assessed the mer-
its of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in light of the objec-
tives of antitrust law."1 The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
evolved from a narrow rule first espoused in United States v. Yel-
low Cab Co.' In Yellow Cab, the Yellow Cab Co. allegedly con-
spired in violation of the Sherman Act to restrain and control the
31. The Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Copperweld
and Regal was also named as a defendant. The defendants were also charged with
an attempt to monopolize the market for structural steel tubing in violation of
Sherman § 2. Those assertions were dismissed before trial.
The defendants counterclaimed that the plaintiffs and Grohne used proprie-
tary information that belonged to Regal, competed unfairly and interfered with
prospective business relationships. The court directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs on the defendants' counterclaims prior to the close of the evidence. Id.
32. The jury found that Yoder was not a participant in the conspiracy. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
37. Id. at 318.
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2736.
39. Id.
40. 104 S. Ct. 2731.
41. Id. at 2736.
42. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
1985]
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purchase and operation of taxicabs by the principal companies op-
erating taxicabs in Chicago, New York City, Pittsburgh, and Min-
neapolis.4 s The majority of the operating companies in those cities,
formerly independent, came under Yellow Cab's control by acqui-
sition or merger." In discussing the mergers, the Court introduced
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine by stating:
The fact that these restraints occur in a setting described by the
appellees as a vertically integrated enterprise does not necessarily
remove the ban of the Sherman Act. The test of illegality under
the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on
interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from
a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under
common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent. Similarly, any affiliation or integration
flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators
from the sanctions which Congress has imposed. The corporate
interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not de-
terminative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That stat-
ute is aimed at substance rather than form ....
And so in this case, the common ownership and control of
the various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the al-
leged combination and conspiracy from the impact of the Act.
The complaint charges that the restraint of interstate trade was
not only effected by the combination of the appellees but was the
primary object of the combination. The theory of the complaint
• . . is that "dominating power" over the cab operating companies
"was not obtained by normal expansion to meet the demands of a
business growing as a result of superior and enterprising manage-
ment, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control. 45
In Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc.,"
the Court summarily disposed of the defendants' argument that
they were "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-mer-
chandising unit" 47 by citing Yellow Cab. In Keifer, two wholly
owned subsidiaries were found liable under Sherman section 1 for
imposing maximum resale prices on customers. 48 The Supreme
Court affirmed the jury's verdict by stating that the defendants'
43. Id. at 224.
44. Id. at 221-22.
45. Id. at 227-28 (citations omitted, emphasis added by the Court in Cop-
perweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736).
46. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
47. Id. at 215.
48. Id. at 211.
374 [Vol. 7:369
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argument was counter to past decisions declaring that common
ownership and control did not protect corporations from the im-
pact of antitrust laws, especially when the defendants held them-
selves out as competitors."9
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,50 the Supreme
Court upheld the antitrust liability of an Ohio corporation for con-
spiring in violation of Sherman section 1 through restrictive agree-
ments with its partly owned European affiliates." The Court un-
dertook little analysis of the doctrine apart from a citation to
Keifer supporting their conclusion that "the fact that there is com-
mon ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not
liberate them from the impact of antitrust laws." 5
The Court continued its use of the doctrine in Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.3 In Perma Life, the
plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy between a parent corporation and
three subsidiaries to impose illegal restrictions on franchisees. 54
The Court upheld liability, stating that since the defendants had
"availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through sep-
arate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities." 5
The Supreme Court clearly made use of the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine prior to the Copperweld decision. 56 However,
although it appeared to have the Court's acceptance, the doctrine
was never given a primary role in Sherman Act decisions. 7 As a
result, the Court never articulated the underlying antitrust ratio-
nales of the doctrine5" or developed an analysis for determining in-
49. Id. at 215.
50. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 598.
53. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 141-42.
56. See Schine Chain Theatres Inc. v. U.S., 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948) (citing
Yellow Cab for the proposition that the affiliated companies were capable of con-
spiracy); U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (holding that the concerted acts of
parents and subsidiaries were unlawful conspiracies).
57. "Although the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on a number
of occasions, a finding of intraenterprise conspiracy was in all but perhaps one
instance unnecessary to the result." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736.
58. Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Ap-
proach, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732, 1743 (1983).
1985] 375
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traenterprise liability.59 Only one rule was clear-separately incor-
porated subdivisions could conspire with their parent
corporations."
ANALYSIS
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,61 the Su-
preme Court held that the coordinated acts of a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary fell outside the reach of Sherman
section 1.2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger traced
the history of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine from the lan-
guage of Yellow Cab,63 through the holding in Perma Life, 4 and
concluded that although the cases displayed support for the doc-
trine, it was never a necessary element for the imposition of anti-
trust liability. He found that the corporate affiliation of.the Yellow
Cab defendants was irrelevant because the original mergers in-
volved were illegal, 6 the Keifer-Stewart and Perma Life defen-
dants were guilty of illegally combining with other outside par-
ties,66  and majority ownership was lacking between the
conspirators in Timken. 7 Supreme Court cases involving the in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine therefore condemned acts that
were unlawful under standard antitrust doctrines.6 s
The Court grounded its reasoning on the distinction between
unilateral and concerted conduct, and the relationship the distinc-
tion has to the terms "contract, combination .. or conspiracy" in
section 1.69 The Court held that the coordinated activity of a par-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1744.
61. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
62. Id.
63. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
64. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
65. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737.
66. Id. at 2738-39.
67. Id. at 2739.
68. Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451, 452
(1983).
69. Wholly unilateral acts cannot result in a contract, combination or con-
spiracy. As a result, agreements among officers or employees of the same firm to
implement a unified firm policy are not within the reach of Sherman § 1. There is
also general agreement that internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and
one of its unincorporated divisions is conduct of a single actor and thus, also
outside the reach of Sherman § 1. Coordination within a single corporate enter-
prise does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic
.[Vol. 7:369
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ent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a
single enterprise for antitrust purposes because there are no sepa-
rate entities to provide the plurality of actors required in a section
1 violation.70 Since "[a] parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
have a complete unity of interest,"'7' there is no sudden joinder of
disparate economic resources and interest to justify section 1
scrutiny.7 2
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens in dis-
sent.73 Justice Stevens argued strongly that the majority, by an-
nouncing a per se rule that a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary
were incapable of conspiring under section 1, renounced a general
rule of law recognized by the commentators, 4 the lower courts,7 5
and the Supreme Court itself.76 By holding that agreements be-
tween parent and subsidiary merely involved unilateral conduct,
the majority rejected its own traditional understanding of conspir-
acies, and the objectives of the Sherman Act.77
The dissent urged the Court to look at the actual conduct of
the defendant corporations, the purpose of which was to exclude a
competitor from the market.78 The dissenting Justices expressed
power previously pursuing separate interests. To hold such conduct out as invit-
ing liability for antitrust violations would discourage corporations from creating
divisions with their presumed benefits and deprive consumers of the efficiencies
that decentralized management bring. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
70. Id. at 2742. See generally Contractor Util. Sales Co. Inc. v. Certain-teed
Products Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1981) ("to establish an unlawful
combination or conspiracy, there must be evidence that two or more parties have
knowingly participated in a common scheme or design ... .
71. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2745.
74. See, e.g. Areeda, supra note 68; Handler & Smart, The Present Status of
the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 23 (1981); McQuade,
Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41
VA. L. REV. 183 (1955); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Cor-
porate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20 (1968); Comment, supra note 58.
75. E.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1054 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Ogilvie v.
Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 587-88 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v.
Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906,
(1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
76. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
77. 104 S. Ct. at 2750.
78. Id. at 2752-55.
19851 377
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little doubt that the anticompetitive actions of the defendants
would be manifestly illegal under Sherman section 1 if the parties
were not interrelated. 9 As a result, they should not be immunized
from antitrust liability because of their corporate form. °
The dissenting opinion is correct because it supports the
objectives of antitrust legislation, and it follows a line of cases that
undeniably indicates that a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiaries can conspire in violation of section 1. The ma-
jority opinion fell short, not in its analysis of the substantive unity
of interest between a parent and a subsidiary, but in its failure to
address the significance of the anticompetitive conduct engaged in
by the defendants. The majority acted prematurely by repudiating
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine without attempting to de-
velop a workable standard for applying the doctrine in light of the
objectives of antitrust legislation. The dissent, however, undertook
a positive analysis of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine that
carefully upholds the purposes of the Sherman Act.
The majority criticized the intraenterprise doctrine for focus-
ing on the structure of an enterprise while ignoring the reality of
shared interests.81 However, by announcing a per se rule, the ma-
jority also elevates form over substance. In any antitrust suit, the
reality is the restraint of trade. The majority's holding that a par-
ent corporation cannot conspire with its wholly owned subsidiaries
automatically elevates the form of the corporation over the reality
of the substantial restraint of trade. In the Court's own words,
"[aintitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate
subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly
owned subsidiary." '82
Multi-faceted enterprises often have valid economic and legal
reasons for choosing to operate through incorporated subsidiar-
ies. 3 They should be free to structure themselves to promote cor-
porate economy and efficiency.8' The majority, however, interprets
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine as creating a presumption
79. Id. at 2755.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2743; Areeda, supra note 68, at 451, 473.
82. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2743.
83. A corporation may adopt the subsidiary form of organization for valid
management purposes. Separate incorporation can improve management, avoid
special tax problems arising from multistate operations or serve other legitimate
interests. Id.
84. Id.
[Vol. 7:369
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of antitrust liability that arises when subsidiaries incorporate.85 It
speaks in terms of "increased exposure" to antitrust liability 6
which allegedly results in a harsher treatment of incorporated sub-
sidiaries under the doctrine.8 7
In reality, there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about
incorporated subsidiaries. The Court agreed that they pose no im-
minent threat to competition.8 Subjecting incorporated subsidiar-
ies to the terms of Sherman section 1 imposes on them no greater
threat of antitrust liability than it does on every other "person"
covered by the Act.8 9 There is no presumption of conspiracy be-
tween the parent and the subsidiary. Plaintiffs alleging intraenter-
prise conspiracies to violate section 1 retain the burden of proving
an agreement to unreasonably restrain trade.90 Frivolous chal-
lenges to reasonable conduct incident to desirable, legal integration
will fail on their own for lack of merit.91
The majority opinion held that the coordinated activities of a
parent corporation and its subsidiaries must be viewed as those of
a single enterprise, for antitrust purposes, because of their com-
plete unity of interest and therefore cannot violate Sherman sec-
tion 1.92 The majority concluded that these coordinated activities
were "wholly unilateral" in nature.9 3 However, in order to justify
the majority's holding, it is necessary to conclude that the majority
placed an arbitrary limit on the legal significance of the act of in-
corporation. The majority creates its own underlying assumption
that, for purposes of antitrust regulation, incorporating a subsidi-
ary does not result in the creation of a new and separate legal
entity.
The act of incorporating a subsidiary should not be given a
limited legal effect for antitrust purposes and, presumably, full le-
gal effect for managerial or tax purposes. The act of incorporating
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2744.
88. Id. at 2743.
89. "The intracorporate doctrine applies, if at all, only to intracorporate con-
duct that can be characterized as predatory or coercive vis-a-vis outsiders." C.
HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR 14 (2d ed. 1978).
90. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2-14 (2d ed.
1984).
91. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2742.
19851 379
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a subsidiary creates a separate legal entity which, when acting in
concert with the parent corporation, is governed by section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Court, itself, has declared that an enterprise
which chooses to accept the benefits of separate incorporation
must face the possibility of being treated as entities capable of
conspiring in antitrust law.94
A close reading of the Sherman Act's distinction between uni-
lateral and concerted conduct and the section 1 focus on concerted
behavior reveals a gap in the proscription against unreasonable re-
straints of trade.9 5 Section 1 prohibits unreasonable restraints of
trade caused as the result of a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy.96 It is also possible, however, for a single firm to unreasonably
restrain trade if it possesses sufficient market power.9 Therefore,
short of threatened monopolization, the Sherman Act does not
reach the anticompetitive conduct of a single firm, even though its
effects may be indistinguishable from the effects of a two-firm con-
spiracy." When a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidi-
aries are deemed to be a single enterprise, they are effectively im-
munized against antitrust liability for even blatantly
anticompetitive conduct. Corporate executives will then rush to
avoid all section 1 liability by incorporating their subdivisions.
Such a reading of the Sherman Act would serve to obliterate its
basic antitrust purposes, and can not have been the intent of
Congress.9
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the effect of the Cop-
perweld holding on the enforcement of antitrust laws will be
slight.100 Indeed, the anticompetitive activities of corporations and
their wholly owned subsidiaries will continue to be policed through
application of other antitrust measures. 01
The majority also concluded that its holding will have the
94. "[S]ince [defendants] availed themselves of the privilege of doing busi-
ness through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save
them from any of the obligations the law imposes on separate entities." 392 U.S.
at 141-42.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 2744, 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2744.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2745.
101. See supra note 13.
[Vol. 7:369380
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beneficial effect of eliminating frivolous treble damage suits."'2 It is
unfortunate, however, that the majority chose to sacrifice the sig-
nificant deterrent effects of the possibility of treble damages judg-
ments in antitrust suits for the sake of expediency. Frivolous law-
suits will inevitably fail on their merits, and courts can easily
impose costs in the event that a suit is found to be baseless.
CONCLUSION
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,1 3 the Su-
preme Court held that parent corporations and their wholly owned
subsidiaries are incapable of conspiring together in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.10 4 The holding effectively overruled
many of the Court's decisions in prior Sherman Act cases and sum-
marily repudiated the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. 10 5 The
Court found that parent and wholly owned subsidiary corporations
are completely unified in their interests and, therefore, do not pro-
vide the plurality of actors necessary for a section 1 violation. 06
The effect of Copperweld is to immunize the coordinated acts of
parent and wholly owned subsidiary corporations from antitrust li-
ability regardless of whether the acts are manifestly illegal or un-
reasonable under standard antitrust regulations and in light of
traditional antitrust objectives.10 7
The Court acted prematurely, choosing to eliminate the doc-
trine rather than to develop a workable standard for its applica-
tion. The majority opinion suffers from the same defect that the
majority finds in the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine-it fo-
cuses too much on corporate form.1 0 8 A per se ruling that incorpo-
rated subsidiaries cannot conspire to violate Sherman section 1
with their parent corporation is as blindly unrealistic as the view
that incorporated subsidiaries are inherently anticompetitive. 0 9
The Court moved from one extreme to the other by losing sight of
the purposes of antitrust law-preventing and punishing anticom-
petitive behavior. 10 Although an in-depth discussion of the matter
102. 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
103. 104 S. Ct. 2731.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 2.
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is beyond the scope of this Note, the Court needs to develop a
workable intraenterprise conspiracy standard.111 Until that time,
courts should examine the facts of each individual case to deter-
mine intraenterprise capacity to conspire." 2
In circumstances where intraenterprise activities are anticom-
petitive in nature and result in unreasonable restraints of trade,
the courts should treat the actors as separate legal entities and
look for an agreement to restrain trade unreasonably. Such a stan-
dard would subject intracorporated enterprises to the very same
scrutiny as independent, unrelated corporations.
' 3
Both of the opinions in Copperweld acknowledged the pres-
ence of a gap in the Sherman Act's enforcement of antitrust pol-
icy.11 Short of monopolization or attempts to monopolize, large di-
versified organizations are virtually immune from the effects of
antitrust liability and the deterrent check of treble damage judg-
ments. 5 Perhaps it is time for Congress to fill in the gap and cre-
ate a Sherman-type check on the anticompetitive behavior of indi-
vidual, yet multi-faceted, corporate entities.
Ellen M. Gregg
111. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that Section 1 liability should be invoked on a test of "sufficient
independence.");
The courts have avoided formulating a specific test for determining
whether an intra-enterprise conspiracy exists, looking instead to factors
such as the degree to which management of the corporations is inte-
grated, whether the corporations hold themselves out as competitors,
whether the concerted action restrains the trade of outsiders to the cor-
porate family, the motive for separate incorporation, and whether the co-
ordinated behavior results in substantial efficiencies.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 12-13 (2d ed. 1984);
Comment, supra note 58.
112. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
113. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
114. 104 S. Ct. at 2744, 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
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